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ABSTRACT:  
The current study explores the role of source credibility in continued public concern over climate change and GM 
foods, suggesting that this skepticism is more likely driven by perceptions of scientists as knowledgeable, trustworthy, 
and unbiased- the three primary constructs of source credibility (McCrosky & Teven, 1999; Teven 2008). We analyze 
data from the 2006 GSS survey to empirically measure the components of source credibility, comparing their influence 
and relationship to political ideology in perceptions of CC impacts and willingness to consume GM foods. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Climate change (CC) is a process of systematic shifts in the earth’s biophysical conditions, 
discerned via disruptions in weather patterns and global temperature, among others (Dunlap & 
Brulle, 2015; Weber, 2010). In contrast, genetically modified foods (GM) are products humans 
(in)directly consume through agrifood production and processing (Varzakas, et al., 2007).1 
Although neither of these phenomena is immediately observable, their respective political-
economic impacts are significant. For example, the estimated costs associated with greenhouse 
gas emissions, the leading cause of climate change, “will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of 
global GDP each year, now and forever” (Stern, et al., 2007, p. vi), while widespread ecosystem 
disturbance will disrupt livelihoods of vulnerable communities around the world (Adger, et al., 
2013). Furthermore, nearly half of U.S. cropland is now dedicated to the cultivation of GM food 
                                                 
1 Although genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are used in medicine and pharmaceuticals, gene therapy, and environmental 
management, as well as agriculture and food production, the latter is the focus of this study. Of the 12 most common GM crops, 9 
are grown directly for human consumption, while other GM crops used for livestock feed and in food processing enter our food 
supply indirectly (see Scott et al., 2018).  
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crops (Fernandez-Cornejo, et al., 2014, cited in Scott et al. 2018), and the recent “megamergers” 
of Dow-DuPont and Monsanto-Bayer now concentrate GM production in the hands of only five 
transnational corporations (Fung & Dewewy, 2018). 
Both CC and GM occur at the nexus of science and society, posing existential questions 
about humans’ relationship to- and effects on- natural systems (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015; Clancy, 
2016; Weber, 2010). Researchers have pointed to scientific illiteracy and issue complexity 
among others, as major contributors to the continued lack of public acceptance of scientific 
consensus about anthropogenic climate change and safety of GM foods (Boykoff, McNatt, & 
Goodman, 2015; Marques, Critchley, & Walshe, 2015; Roser-Renouf et al., 2015).  
However, as Wildavsky and Dake (1990) note, “[i]t is not only that ‘the facts’ cannot by 
themselves convince doubters, but that behind one set of facts are always other [factors]” that 
influence public perceptions of and decision-making about environmental science (p. 55). 
Individuals filter scientific information through interpretive schemata and use moral reasoning to 
make decisions (Passini, 2010). Pre-existing beliefs, values and identity, political affiliation, 
socio-economic status and other factors influence public attitudes about science and trust in 
scientific evidence (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Brahman, 2010; Pechar, Brenauer, & Mayer, 2018; 
Rutjens et al., 2018). Recent work has suggested that lack of trust in science and perceptions of 
scientific bias have contributed to conflicting understandings and even skepticism of CC and GM 
(Funk & Kennedy, 2016a-b; Krosnick, Holbrook, Lowe, & Visser, 2006; McComas, Besley, & 
Steinhardt, 2014; Pechar et al., 2018; Vraga, Myers, Kotcher, Beall, & Maibach, 2018). Given 
these dynamics, it is possible that a lack of trust in science and perceptions of specific scientific 
sources are also likely to contribute to skepticism about these issues. We take this critical tension 
as our starting point.  
The present study extends research on the role of source credibility in science 
communication (Guachat, O’Brien, & Mirosa, 2017; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-2; McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Teven, 2008), by empirically measuring the 
multidimensionality of this construct. We define source credibility as an audience’s perceptions 
of “trustworthiness” (character, honesty) (McCroskey & Teven, 1999), “expertise” 
(qualifications, intelligence, authority, knowledge), and “goodwill” (caring, responsiveness, 
concern, empathy) (Teven, 2008). Although extant research primarily has tested a singular 
dimension of source credibility, defining it as a multi-item construct may capture more variation 
in perceptions of credibility (McCroskey & Teven, 1999; Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997). 
Additionally, given previously identified ideological differences in the perceived source 
credibility of scientists (Wald & Williams, 2017), we examine the degree to which each 
component of source credibility mediates the relationship between political ideology and public 
perceptions of skepticism toward CC and GM foods. Finally, as an exploratory aim we 
investigate whether perceived source credibility, and its influence on scientific skepticism, are 
contingent on the nature of the science in question. 
 
 
2. SOURCE CREDIBILITY 
 
Science alone cannot persuade because scientific knowledge is enfolded with politics, 
economics, and culture (Jasonoff, 2012). Individuals use interpretative schemata and moral 
reasoning to process scientific information and make decisions (Passini, 2010), and audiences 
make judgements about the speaker as well as the content of a message (Aristotle, 4th Century 
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BCE/1991). In communication about risk, uncertainty, or the causes and consequences of 
scientific phenomena source credibility functions as a heuristic, or shortcut, that influences 
public acceptance of scientific information (Hovland & Weiss 1951-2). The public is more likely 
to accept recommendations from sources that corroborate the views espoused by experts 
perceived to be credible (Darmofal, 2005). Compared to low-credibility sources, high-credibility 
sources can increase the effectiveness of strategic communication, including the likelihood of 
producing desired shifts in target attitudes and behavior (see Pornpitakpan, 2004 for a review).  
 Source credibility is a key predictor of public concern about scientific evidence (Guachat, 
O’Brien, & Mirosa, 2017; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-2; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Teven, 2008). 
Importantly, source credibility is not static or unidimensional, but includes an audience’s 
perceptions of the source’s “trustworthiness” (character, honesty, believability) (McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999), “expertise” (qualifications, intelligence, authority, knowledge), and “goodwill” 
(caring, responsiveness, concern, empathy) (Teven, 2008). Each has been shown to play a 
significant role in how publics use scientific information and influence public perceptions of 
scientists’ credibility. 
In recent years, scholars have demonstrated the importance of public trust in science and 
scientists (see Engdahl & Lidskog, 2014 for an overview). Audiences are more amenable to 
evidence from trusted sources and more likely to rebuff information from sourced they distrust 
(Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eiser, Miles, & Frewer, 
2002; Frewer, Sholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 
1951-2). Regarding policy decisions, Gibson et al. (2005) found that institutions and policy 
makers are more likely to engender public support and gain public “acceptance, acquiescence, 
and compliance” when they are perceived as trustworthy (p. 187). Trust in science and scientists 
is a particularly important factor affecting public attitudes in scientific and environmental 
domains (Brewer & Ley, 2013; Brossard & Shanahan, 2003; Myers, Kotcher, Stenhouse, 
Anderson, Maibach…, 2016). For example, Hamilton (2015) suggests that measurements of 
individuals’ trust in scientists and scientific evidence about climate change or nuclear power are 
equivalent to measurements of individuals’ general attitudes about these topics. Frewer, 
Scholderer, and Bredahl (2003) have also found that trust can mediate attitudes toward new 
scientific technologies.  
Expertise refers to “competence” (McCroskey & Teven, 1999), “specialized knowledge” 
(Horton et al., 2016), and the degree to which a source is perceived as making correct assertions 
(Hansen, Holm, Frewer, Robinson, & Sandøe 2003; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-1952). Scientists 
are ascribed particular expertise because they communicate from what Goodnight (2012) has 
called the “technical sphere,” or discursive context that privileges particular norms, styles of 
engagement, and argumentative appeals, a position that affords them legitimacy and cultural 
authority (Gauchat, 2011; O’Brien, 2012). Public perceptions of risk can be reduced when 
government agencies link messages or collaborate with expert stakeholders, such as a relevant 
consumer organization or committee (Dean & Shepherd, 2007). However, although the scientific 
community represents technical expertise, citizens and policy makers disagree on the extent to 
which scientists should contribute to policy decisions (Backstrand, 2003). Per Jasanoff (2003), 
experts “exercise a form of delegated authority...act[ing] on publics’ behalf” when they 
participate in policy making processes; the perception that scientists’ expertise is being used for 
political ends can contribute to public skepticism (p. 159).  
Trustworthiness and expertise have each been tested for their respective impact on source 
credibility (Frewer, Sholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Engdahl & Lidskog, 2014; McCroskey & 
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Teven, 1999; Renn & Levine, 1989). Goodwill, the third- and perhaps “lost” (McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999)- dimension of source credibility has received considerably less attention. Rooted in 
the Aristotelian concept of ethos, goodwill represents the degree to which a speaker is perceived 
as caring, demonstrated through empathy in direct interactions with others (Horton et al., 2016; 
Hovland et al., 1953; Teven, 2008). Thus, goodwill is “a meaningful predictor of believability 
and likeableness” (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). In the context of science communication, this 
dimension has been interpreted as publics’ perception of scientists as working in the public’s best 
interest (Horton et al., 2016; Heazle & Kane, 2015; McCroskey, 1992). Eagly, Wood, and 
Chaiken (1978) found that a source is “considered less manipulative and more sincere when he 
[sic]disconfirmed rather than confirmed the expectancy based on the audience’s identity” (p. 
431). Extending this, Frewer et al. (2003) report that perceptions that an information source has 
“a vested interest in promoting a particular view” can increase negative attitudes in the public (p. 
1118). Finally, citizens and elected officials are reluctant to delegate decision making to experts 
who are not perceived as accountable to the public (Jasanoff, 2003).  
In sum, source credibility and its multiple components is a key predictor of public 
concern about scientific evidence (Guachat, O’Brien, & Mirosa, 2017; Hovland & Weiss, 1951-
2; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Teven, 2008), perceptions of scientists as technical experts (Dean & 
Shepherd, 2007), and the role of science in public policy and decision making (Backstrand, 
2003; Jasanoff, 2003). The three dimensions of source credibility- trust, expertise, and goodwill- 
have been largely studied individually, yet previous research suggests that a multi-item construct 
that includes all three dimensions is a more accurate measure of source credibility (McCroskey 
& Teven, 1999; Peters, Covello, & McCallum, 1997). Furthermore, Horton et al. (2016) suggest 
the need for a “situationally nuanced understanding of credibility,” and encourage consideration 
of “which dimensions of credibility are most important in each [communication] situation” (p. 
31). With this in mind, the present study compares perceptions of source credibility across two 
environmental science communication contexts: climate change (CC) and genetically modified 
foods (GM).  
 
2.1 Source Credibility and Climate Change  
While not directly observable, climate change (CC) is indicated by, among other trends, 
biodiversity loss, sea level and global temperature rise, and shifts in weather (Weber, 2010). 
Scientific evidence of these impacts enters into a political economic terrain made contentious by 
competing objectives, varied interests, and divergent values.  Despite scientific consensus, 
debate about the existence, cause, and extent of global climate change has divided the public 
sphere for more than a quarter century (McCright & Dunlap, 2000). The general public receives 
information about climate change from various sources including, mass media, politicians and 
policy-makers, newsweeklies such as Time, science magazines, non-profit groups, and 
government agencies (Brulle, et al., 2012; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet & 
Kotcher,2009; Weber, 2010). When scientific information or policy recommendations from these 
sources diverge, source credibility becomes a critical tool that the public uses to interpret 
scientific evidence and conflicting information about science (Zanna, Olson, & Herman, 1987), 
including the causes, consequences and risks associated with CC impacts. 
Diverse audiences engage in CC-related issues differently, advocating various behavioral 
responses and policy outcomes. The “Six Americas” framework developed by Roser-Renouf et 
al. (2015) delineates a range of six CC positions- from alarmed to dismissive- based on the 
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degree to which they accept or reject climate science, as well as cognitive and affective issue 
engagement. Theorizing the role of “climate imaginaries,” or shared socio-semiotic systems of 
meaning and cultural values related to CC, Levy and Spicer (2013) contend that “ideologies, 
normative commitments, scientific understandings and material interests” shape economic and 
policy responses at various scales (p. 663). Extending this, Bliuc et al. (2015) suggest that CC 
skepticism is more than an opinion, representing instead “an aspect of self” that drives one’s 
social and political action (p. 226). Thus, individuals’ pre-existing attitudes, beliefs, and values 
influence perception of and responses to CC (Kahan, 2015; Kahan, et al., 2010; Weber, 2010). 
Among the general public, scientists consistently rank as the most trusted sources of 
information about climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2013). Trust in science is positively 
associated with certainty that climate change is occurring, and belief in anthropogenic climate 
change (Carlton & Jacobson, 2016; Hmielowski et al. 2014; Mase et al. 2015; Nisbet & Myers 
2007). Trust in science and scientists can decrease climate skepticism (Malka, Krosnick & 
Langer, 2009; McCright 2016), and is related to support for climate change policies (Brewer & 
Ley, 2013; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; O’Connor, Bord, Fisher, Staneva, Kozhouharova-
Zhivkova…, 1999).  
Gauchat, O’Brien, and Mirosa (2017) find that perceptions of environmental scientists’ 
legitimacy as policy advisors are a function of their perceived credibility (p. 298). Yet scholars 
have also argued that climate scientists may be particularly vulnerable to perceptions of bias as 
their ability to obtain grants and to publish in scientific journals is, by default, predicated on the 
existence of harmful CC impacts (Yearly, 2014). Indeed, a recent national survey revealed that 
most Americans do not believe that climate scientists’ research findings are influenced most of 
the time by concern for the best interests of the public (Funk & Kennedy, 2016a). The degree to 
which scientists are perceived as serving the nation’s best interest is the “most important single 
factor…for determining public support for [environmental] scientists in policy settings” 
(O’brien, 2012, p. 812), making perception of the integrity of environmental scientists’ policy 
advice a potentially critical predictor of perceptions of their legitimacy (Gauchat et al., 2017). 
 
2.2 Source Credibility and GM 
In agriculture, genetic engineering (GE)2 constitutes the selective breeding of particular traits for 
crop optimization, be it for yield, rate of growth, drought resistance, herbicide complementarity, 
pesticide resistance, among others uses (see Varzakas, et al., 2007 for a review); genetically 
modified foods are the “most visible product” of this process (Clancy, 2016, p. 4). Widespread 
proliferation in the global marketplace (Scott, et al. 2018) and a multiplicity of stakeholders 
make the political economy of GM, and its communication, complex (Clancy, 2016; McComas, 
Besley & Steinhardt, 2014). A variety of sources- from government agencies, agricultural 
producers, and biotech corporations, to agroscientists and medical researchers, lobby 
organizations, and environmental and consumer groups- provide information and 
recommendations about GM, often with competing objectives (Roe & Tiesl, 2007).  Because 
constructions of risk pervade “the process of manufacturing, the GM products, and the unknown 
implications of the technology” (emphasis original, Clancy, 2016, p. 2), source credibility can 
                                                 
2 Genetic engineering refers to “the introduction or change in DNA, RNA, or proteins manipulated by humans to 
effect a change in an organism’s genome or epigenome” (NASEM, p. 36). 
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impact individuals’ acceptance of GM as well as consumer behavior (Scott et al., 2018; other 
cites). Moreover, members of the public generally lack control over the development, 
implementation and political process that governs GM food (Marques, Critchley & Walshe 
2015), making source credibility a potentially important predictor of public attitudes toward GM 
food.  
Much of the previous research on public support for GM has focused on the perceived 
trustworthiness of risk managers (see McComas, Besley & Steinhardt, 2014 for a review). This 
work has generally found that public acceptance of GM is strongly associated with trust in the 
institutions and scientists involved in GE research and development (Frewer, Sholderer, & 
Bredahl, 2003; Siegrist 2000), with increased trust contributing to greater support for 
biotechnology and reduced risk-related concerns (Brossard & Shanahan, 2003; Salvadori et al., 
2004). Consumers have the least amount of trust in industry and government sources (Cook, 
2006; Costa-Font & Mossialos, 2007; Dean & Shepherd, 2007; Savadori, et al. 2004). Given the 
range of information sources communicating about GM, a lack of consumer trust in relevant 
institutions can hinder public acceptance of biotechnology (Costa-Font & Mossialos, 2007). 
Indeed, as Frewer, et al. (2003) report, “a distrusted information source that is perceived to have 
a vested interest in promoting a particular view may increase public negativity toward a 
technology” (p. 1118).  
In addition to trust, scholars have suggested the GM debate is influenced by the degree to 
which scientists and other technical experts are perceived as legitimate and fair (Clancy, 2016; 
McComas et al., 2008). In their analysis of texts addressing the sustainability implications of 
GM, Gauthier and Kappen (2017) identify “undue influence [of GM industries] on government” 
and “regulators [that] do not act in the interest of public health or public right to know” as major 
stakeholder concerns (p. 224). Dean and Shepherd (2007) also report that government agencies 
can be perceived “more positively as having fewer vested interests” if their GM messages are 
linked with other credible sources acting in the public’s best interest (p. 460).   
The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM, 2016) and the 
American Association for the Advacnement of Science (AAS, 2013) report wide agreement 
among scientists that GM food is safe for human consumption. Yet, as Clancy (2016) notes, 
“scientific evidence has not been sufficient to counter [GM] skepticism in the U.S.” (p. 2). To 
date, American consumers still perceive GM as “very risky” (NASEM, 2016). A recent study 
revealed that 57% of U.S. adults do not believe that scientists fully understand the health effects 
of GM foods (Pew Research Center, 2015).  In the U.S., public concern about GM has prompted 
efforts to pass legislation requiring food labels that identify the use of GM ingredients in food 
(Pechar et al., 2018). While previous scholars have explored several of the components of source 
credibility within the context of GM food, none have yet fully explored this multi-item construct 
or how it might mediate the relationship between ideology and trust in science and scientists 
involved in public debate about CC and GM food.  
 
2.3 Political Ideology  
Individuals’ identification with a particular political ideology functions as a lens for interpreting 
scientific claims, assessing scientists’ legitimacy, as well as evaluating scientists’ credibility 
(Funk & Kennedy, 2016a-b; Gauchat, 2012; Kahan, 2013; Nisbet, 2009; Nisbet, et al., 2015; 
Pechar, et al. 2018). When it comes to controversial social topics, cultural worldviews and 
identity influence individuals’ interpretations of scientific information (Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). 
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The shared values, moral understandings and identities that connect stakeholders together in an 
“in group” community can also lead “in group” members to reject contrary beliefs and 
perspectives (Passini, 2010). As Scott et al. (2018) note, “once a scientific issue becomes aligned 
with a broader social orientation, people tend to ignore the views of experts in favor of the views 
of their ideological in-group” (p. 12.13). Indeed, “in group” members are more likely to reject 
“out group” sources as less trustworthy or knowledgeable than “in group” sources (Mackie & 
Quellar, 2000). When science is inconsistent with people’s beliefs and the beliefs of their 
political party, they may be less inclined to trust it and to be persuaded by it (Kahan, 2015; 
Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015). Indeed, people may be more inclined to accept scientific 
information from those who match their political groups, especially from an opinionated or 
charismatic leader (Kahan, 2013; Nisbet & Kotcher, 2009). However, disagreement among 
political elites contributes to polarization, leading “citizens [to] rely on other indicators, such 
as…source credibility to make up their minds” (p. 52). An ideological gap in perceptions of 
science and source credibility is clear and persistent ˗ conservatives’ trust in science, for 
example, has declined dramatically since the 1970s (Guachat, 2012) - and evident in both CC 
and GM contexts.   
Democrats are more likely to trust information from climate scientists than Republicans 
(Hamilton, 2015). Indeed, Nisbet (2009) suggests, partisan division is so entrenched that climate 
change “has joined a short list of issues such as gun control or taxes that define what it means to 
be a Republican or Democrat” (p. 14). A recent Pew Research Center study found that 15% of 
conservative Republicans trust climate scientists to provide them with full and accurate 
information on the causes of climate change, and 11% believe climate scientists understand very 
well the causes of climate change (Funk & Kennedy, 2016a). Additionally, the Pew study reports 
that 23% of moderate Democrats and 36% of liberal Democrats believe that scientists understand 
the best ways to address climate change. McCright and Dunlap (2011) have identified a so-called 
"conservative white male effect" in which conservative white males are significantly less likely 
to believe in, or perceive risk from, anthropogenic climate change. Brulle et al. (2012) find that 
“elite partisan battle”- fomented by Congressional leaders’ voting records and public statements- 
is “the most important factor in influencing public opinion on climate change” (p. 1985).   
 Political ideology may also play a role in determining beliefs about the risks associated 
with biotechnology and the credibility of sources of scientific information about the safety of 
GMOs. Compared to conservative respondents, liberals are more likely to trust scientists as 
sources of information about GM3 (Hamilton, 2015). Generally, conservatives express greater 
trust in “production” science focused on economic or technological innovation, while liberals are 
more likely to trust “impact” science assessing consequences on human and environmental 
health (McCright, et al. 2013). Yet the Pew study mentioned above found no difference in the 
number of Republicans and Democrats who care a great deal about the issue of GM foods (Funk 
& Kennedy, 2016b). Researchers point to the need for greater specificity in measuring 
perceptions of various science issues (Kahan, 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011) as political 
ideology may “lead individuals to trust or distrust science in different ways” (Pechar et al. 2018, 
p. 295).  
While a recent study by Nisbet et al. (2015) confirmed conservatives’ distrust of the 
scientific consensus on climate change, it also found that liberals reported similarly low levels of 
trust in science when exposed to messages promoting scientific consensus on nuclear power. 
                                                 
3 This may be due, in part, to the large number of liberal respondents who selected “do not know” as their response 
option when asked if they trust scientists for information about GMOs (Hamilton, 2015). 
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These results suggest that distrust in science is not driven solely by a conservative political 
ideology or by distrust in science in general. Instead, scientific skepticism may stem from 
concerns about the perceived trustworthiness and bias of the source of the scientific information 
(Nisbet et al., 2015; Pechar et al., 2018; Priest, Bonfadelli, & Rusanen, 2003). The present study 
expands on this extant research by exploring source credibility as a mechanism through which 
political ideology can affect public skepticism about GM and CC science.  
 
3. AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The current study is motivated by several objectives: to empirically measure source credibility as 
a multi-item construct, to demonstrate the influence of the components of source credibility and 
political ideology on skepticism of CC impacts and willingness to consume GM foods, and to 
compare perceptions of source credibility in the contexts of CC and GM. We provide the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Skepticism about the potential negative impacts associated with climate change will increase as  
respondents become more conservative.  
 
H2: Perceptions of climate scientists’ credibility will decrease as respondents become more conservative.  
 
H3: Skepticism about the safety of GM foods will increase as respondents become more liberal.  
 
H4: Perceptions of medial researchers’ credibility will increase as respondents become more conservative.  
 
H5: Source credibility will mediate the relationship between political ideology and skepticism toward CC  
and GM.   
Corollary to H5: Respondents who perceive climate scientists as credible sources will be less  
skeptical about the impacts of climate change.  
 
Corollary to H5: Respondents who perceive medical researchers as credible sources will be less 
 skeptical about the safety of GM foods.  
 
H6: Source credibility will be directly related to public support for scientific influence on policy. 
 
4. METHODS   
 
4.1 Survey Implementation 
The 8 items reported here were fielded in the 2006 General Social Survey (GSS), conducted 
biannually by the National Opinion Research Center. The GSS is a nationally representative 
household survey of English-speaking persons. In 2006, along with the standard questions 
administered to 4,510 respondents, a subset of questions specific to climate change and 
genetically modified food was asked of 927 respondents.  
 
 
4.2 Measurements 
Sociodemographic variables previously associated with source credibility were included as 
control variables: Gender (1 = male, 2= female) and level of education (0 = no college, 1 = 
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college and beyond) are measured as dummy variables. Age is a continuous variable, and income 
is measured on a 9-point scale (1 = “less than $20,000” to 9 = “$150,000 and above”).  
Political Ideology was measured by asking respondents to rank themselves on a scale 
from “extremely liberal” = 1 to “extremely conservative” = 7. Respondents who answered 
“other” or “do not know” were dropped from analyses.  
Confidence in political and nonpolitical entities has previously been used to explore 
public perceptions of institutional trust and trust in elite groups (see Gauchat, 2012 for a review). 
In this study, confidence in scientists was used as a control variable and was operationalized by 
asking, “I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these 
institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some 
confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” (1=a great deal, 2=some confidence, and 
3=hardly any confidence at all). Respondents answered this question for environmental scientists 
and medical researchers.  
Source Credibility was measured as a composite of perceived bias, expertise and 
agreement. Perceived bias was assessed by asking, “To what extent would the following groups 
support what is best for the country as a whole or what serves their own narrow interests?” 
(1=what is best for the country, 5=own narrow interests). Respondents answered this question for 
environmental scientists making policy recommendations about global warming and medical 
researchers making policy recommendations about genetically modified foods. Perceived 
expertise was measured by asking, “How well do environmental scientists understand the causes 
of global warming?” and “How well do medical researchers understand the risks posed by 
genetically modified foods” (1=very well, 5=not at all). Perceived agreement was measured by 
asking participants, “To what extent do environmental scientists agree among themselves about 
the existence and causes of global warming” and “To what extent do all medical researchers 
agree on the risks and benefits of genetically modified foods?” (1=near complete agreement, 
5=no agreement at all).  
 Beliefs (skepticism) about global warming were assessed by asking respondents to 
consider several potential effects that global warming might have on the polar regions, including 
“Arctic seals may be threatened,” “The northern ice cap may completely melt,” “By 2020, polar 
bears may become extinct,” “Sea level may rise by more than 20 feet, flooding coastal areas,” 
and “Inuit and other native peoples may no longer be able to follow their traditional way of life.” 
For each item, participants were asked to indicate how much these potential consequences of 
global warming would bother them (1 = “a great deal”, 2 = “some”, 3= “a little,” or 4 = “not at 
all”). Because the scale ends with a negative item, it reflects skeptical impact beliefs. To assess 
beliefs about genetically modified foods, we asked participants to indicate “which statement best 
describes their view about eating foods that have been genetically modified” (1 = “I don’t care 
whether or not the food I eat has been genetically modified,” 2 = “I am unwilling to eat 
genetically modified foods,” or 3 = “I will not eat food that I know has been genetically 
modified”). 
Scientific influence on policy was measured by asking “How much influence should 
environmental scientists have in deciding what to do about global warming?” and “How much 
influence should medical researchers have in deciding whether to restrict the sale of genetically 
modified foods?” Responses were measured on a 4-item Likert scale (1 = a great deal of 
influence, 4 = none at all).  
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We conducted reliability tests on each of the multi-item survey measures. The 5-item 
climate change skepticism item was reliable (Chronbach’s  = .843) and the questions were 
aggregated into a single climate change beliefs scale (range = 5-20, M = 8.36, SD = 3.45).  
To evaluate the role of source credibility as a mediator for the influence of political 
ideology on skepticism about CC and GM, we conducted two multiple mediation models (Figure 
1). We selected this method because reliability tests on the on the proposed source credibility 
items revealed that the three source credibility items did not meet the threshold for reliability and 
this approach allowed for the simultaneous evaluation of each of the source credibility measures. 
For each model, the independent variable is political ideology, the mediators are perceived bias, 
perceived expertise and perceived agreement (source credibility) and the outcome variables are 
CC or GM beliefs (skepticism; Figure 1). Based on the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes 
(2008), we used bootstrapped confidence intervals; this method does not require a normal 
distribution and is recommended over the Sobel test. Using a SPSS macro script, we conducted a 
PROCESS 2.16 model with 5,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples with a 95% confidence 
level. A multiple regression model was used to test the fourth hypothesis that source credibility 
increases public support for scientific influence on policy. Sociodemographic items and 
confidence were used as control variables, political ideology, skepticism and source credibility 
were used as independent variables, and support for scientific/medical researchers’ influence on 
policy was used as the dependent variable. For all tests, we use p<0.05 as our cutoff value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proposed multiple mediation model 
 
RESULTS  
 
Most of the respondents were female, white, and had a bachelor’s degree or above. The average 
age was 47 and the median total family income ranged from $40,000 to $59,999 a year. More 
than a quarter of the sample identified as liberal (27% either extremely or moderate). 
Conservatives and political moderates were slightly more abundant (34% either extremely or 
moderate and 39% respectively). Approximately 43% of the sample has a great deal of 
confidence in environmental scientists, 50% only some and 7% hardly any (M = 1.65, SD = 
0.61). Additional details about the respondents, including ideological representation, are 
provided in Table 1.   
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Table 1. Description of the respondents 
 Percentage 
Gender (female) 55.6 
Race (white) 72.2 
Education Attainment (at least bachelor’s degree) 67.5 
Political Ideology  
Liberal  27.2 
Moderate 38.8 
Conservative 34 
*Sample (N=4,510) 
 
Mediation results support hypothesis 1 for the climate change model. Conservative 
political ideology was associated with climate change skepticism, with greater skepticism of 
climate change impacts among extremely conservative respondents (path c). Political ideology 
was significantly related to all three of the source credibility mediators in the climate change 
model (Table 2, path a). Consistent with hypothesis 2, conservative ideology is associated with 
lower levels of perceived scientific source credibility. Respondents who identified climate 
scientists as credible sources were less likely to express skepticism about the impacts of climate 
change (path b). All three of the mediators significantly predicted CC skepticism (Table 2). 
Greater perceptions of scientific bias increased the likelihood of CC skepticism. Thus, our first 
model provided support for our first corollary to H5.  
The climate change model also provided support for H5. The total indirect effect was 
significant, as was each of the specific indirect effects, indicating that perceived agreement, 
perceived bias and perceived understanding each mediated the relationship between political 
ideology and climate skepticism. As shown in the table, the effect of ideology on climate change 
skepticism was reduced from 0.290 to 0.124 by the three mediators and from a highly significant 
(p<0.001) to non-significant relationship, indicating full mediation. 
 
Table 2. Results from moderated-mediation analysis climate change skepticism 
Mediators (M) Path a  
(IV to M) 
Path b  
(M to DV) 
Path c  
(IV to DV 
total) 
Path c’  
(IV to DV 
direct) 
a b  
(Indirect effect) 
Perc. agreement 
climate scientists  
0.079** 0.435***   0.034* 
Perc. bias climate 
scientists 
0.196*** 0.357**   0.070* 
Perc. expertise 
climate scientists 
0.176*** 0.353**   0.062* 
   0.290*** 0.124 Total indirect 
effect: 0.166*      
*p<.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001 
a IV = political ideology and DV = climate change skepticism 
 
The results of the model exploring public skepticism about GM food also provided some 
support for our hypotheses (Table 3). There was no direct effect of political ideology on GM 
skepticism; therefore, the GM model did not support hypothesis 3. There was also no significant 
effect of political ideology on respondents’ perceptions of medical researchers’ expertise or 
agreement about the risks associated with GM food. Political ideology were significantly 
associated with medical researchers’ perceived bias, but not in the expected direction (H4); 
perceptions of medical researchers’ bias increased with conservative ideology. As expected, 
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willingness to consume GM foods (less skeptical) increased as perceptions of medical 
researchers’ bias decreased (path b). Skepticism about GM food was related to perceived lower 
levels of agreement and expertise among medical researchers and higher levels of bias among 
medical researchers. Thus, the GM model did provide support for hypothesis 5 and its corollary. 
Below, we report only the direct effects results of the mediation analysis for the GM model 
(Table 3).    
Table 3. Results from the mediation analysis of GM skepticism 
Predictor B 
Equation predicting mediator (Perc. agreement medical researchers)  
  Intercept 2.838*** 
  Polviews 0.015 
Equation predicting mediator (Perc. bias medical researchers)  
Intercept 1.924*** 
Polviews 0.070* 
Equation predicting mediator (Perc. expertise medical researchers)  
Intercept 2.017*** 
Polviews 0.039 
Equation predicting dependent variable (GM skepticism)  
Intercept -2.314*** 
Medagrgm 0.176* 
Medbstgm 0.168* 
Gmmed 0.225** 
Polviews 0.020 
*p<.05, **p≤.01, ***p≤.001 
 
OLS regression results are presented in Table 4 and 5. In Table 4, the first model tests the 
effects beliefs and demographics on support for scientific influence on climate change policy. 
The second model tests for the effects of adding source credibility to the basic model. Model 1 
results suggest significant main effects of beliefs, including political ideology (β =.126, p≤ .05) 
and GW skepticism (β =.303, p≤ .001), on support for scientific influence on climate change 
policy.  
With regard to support for scientific influence on climate change policy, model 2 was a 
significant improvement over the first model, with an R-squared value above 27%. Model 2 
results revealed main effects of GW skepticism (β =.193, p≤ .001) and all three of the source 
credibility items (bias: β =.206, p≤ .001; agreement: β =.177, p≤ .01; expertise: β =.151, p≤ .05) 
on scientific influence on climate change policy. Once the source credibility items were added to 
the model, the main effect of political ideology on public support for scientific influence on 
climate change policy disappeared. This result provides preliminary support for hypothesis 6: 
source credibility is related to public support for climate change policy. Moreover, it provides 
further evidence that source credibility is the underlying mechanism related to public skepticism 
about scientific evidence of climate change and public support for scientific influence on climate 
change policy.  
In table 5, the first model tests the effects of beliefs and demographics on support for 
medical researchers’ influence on restricting the consumption of GM food. The second model 
tests the effect of adding source credibility as an additional independent variable. None of the 
proposed items were significant predictors in the first model. Model 2 was a significant 
improvement over model 1 (F∆3,297 = 19.43, p<.000). Model 2 results revealed main effects for 
two of the source credibility items (bias: β =.310, p≤ .001; and expertise: β =.132, p≤ .05). This 
finding adds additional evidence to support the hypothesis that source credibility is related to 
public support for medical researchers influence on policies controlling GM food. This model 
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also supported our initial multiple mediation model, suggesting that political ideology is not 
directly related to public opinions about GM food. While none of the demographic variables 
were significant predictors, education trended toward significance in both of the GM models (p 
from .051 to .097). Individuals with a college education were more supportive of medical 
researchers influence on policies affecting the use of GM food.  
Across both of the OLS regression models, as perceived bias and concerns about 
scientific expertise increased (for both scientists and medical researchers), respondents’ support 
for scientific influence on GM or CC policy decreased. As perceived agreement decreased, 
support for scientific influence on CC policy also decreased. Perceived agreement was not 
significant in the OLS model of support for scientific influence on GM policy.   
 
Table 4. OLS regression predicting support for scientific influence on climate change policy# 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 
Demographics   
Gender (female) -.047 .019 
Age .035 .008 
Education (college) .062 .070 
Race (white) .047 .042 
Income -.095 -.044 
Beliefs   
Confidence in scientists (none) -.024 -.065 
Political ideology  
(Strong Conservative) 
.126* .025 
GW skepticism .303*** .193*** 
Source credibility   
Perceived Bias (extremely biased)  .206*** 
Perceived Agreement (none)  .177** 
Perceived Expertise (none)   .151* 
Total % explained R2 14.6 27.9 
 F∆8,285 = 6.09 
p<.000 
F∆3,282 = 17.40 
p<.000 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients are reported 
# Responses were measured on a 4-item Likert scale (1 = a great deal of influence, 4 = none at all).  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 5. OLS regression predicting support for medical influence on policies regulating 
genetically modified foods 
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 
Demographics   
Gender (female) -.034 -.068 
Age .057 .058 
Education (college) -.118 -.093 
Race (white) -.095 -.056 
Income .029 .020 
Beliefs   
Confidence in scientists (none) .076 .014 
Political ideology  
(Strong Conservative) 
.029 .003 
Eat GM food (no) .029 -.012 
Source credibility   
Perceived Bias (extremely biased)  .310*** 
Perceived Agreement (none)  .092 
Perceived Expertise (none)  .132* 
Total % explained R2 3.5 19.4 
 F∆8,300 = 1.38 
p=.205 
F∆3,297 = 19.43 
p<.000 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients are reported 
# Responses were measured on a 4-item Likert scale (1 = a great deal of influence, 4 = none at all).  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The current study supports previous research demonstrating that source credibility is related to 
concern about scientific evidence and perceptions of scientists as technical experts (Gauchat, et 
al., 2017; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Teven, 2008), and that perceived source credibility influences 
scientific skepticism (Nisbet et al., 2015; Pechar et al., 2018) and attitudes toward policy (Hart & 
Nisbet, 2012). Our results expand these insights by comparing CC and GM as two contexts of 
environmental science communication, providing new evidence that attitudes towards climate 
scientists and medical researchers are related to attitudes toward CC and GM science and policy. 
In the case of CC, source credibility was a full mediator, suggesting that source credibility is one 
potential mechanism related to public skepticism about CC impacts. Moreover, the observed 
significant and direct effect of perceived medical researchers’ credibility on willingness to 
consume GM foods provide evidence to suggest that source credibility may have a more 
consistent effect on scientific skepticism, across multiple scientific domains, than political 
ideology.  
Empirical measurement of source credibility as a multi-dimensional construct was the 
primary aim of this study. The inclusion of the three components of source credibility – 
trustworthiness, expertise, and the “lost dimension” of credibility, goodwill (McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999, p. 91) allowed us to more accurately measure source credibility compared to 
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previous research. All three source credibility items were significantly and directly related to CC 
and GM skepticism. Each of the source credibility items independently mediated the relationship 
between political ideology and skepticism about CC impacts. In addition, confidence in scientific 
expertise and perceptions of scientists as unbiased actors pursuing research in the best interests 
of the public was related to increased support for scientific influence on CC and GM policy. This 
effect remained significant when we added control variables to the OLS regression models. The 
importance of perceived bias in all our models highlights the continued need to include this 
construct more consistently in measures of source credibility (Horton et al., 2015; McCroskey & 
Teven, 1999; Peters, Covello, & McCalum, 1997).  
Political ideology can influence beliefs and attitudes about both CC and GM (Funk & 
Kennedy, 2016a-b; Hamilton, 2015; Kahan, 2013; McCright et al., 2013; Nisbet, 2009). 
Consistent with previous research on the relationship between political ideology and climate 
change skepticism (e.g., McCright & Dunlap 2011; McCright 2016), the current study found that 
conservative participants were more likely to be skeptical about scientific evidence of CC 
impacts. However, after accounting for all three source credibility components, there was no 
significant effect of political ideology on impact skepticism, which contradicts previous 
empirical findings (McCright & Dunlap 2011). Compared to the credibility items, political 
ideology had less persistent effects across the models. This finding supports recent criticisms 
about the broad nature of political ideology and skepticism about its role as an antecedent of trust 
in science (Pechar, et al., 2018).  
We found no significant relationship between ideology and concerns about the safety of 
GM food. Instead, our results suggest that ideology is indirectly related to skepticism about GE 
and biotechnology. This finding is consistent with other work pointing to latent antecedents of 
political ideology that impact perceptions of specific science topics (McCright, 2016; Pechar et 
al., 2018; Rutjens et al., 2018). Indeed, Pechar et al. (2018) recently reported that attitudes 
towards government and corporations (two important sources in the debate over GMOs) mediate 
the relationship between ideology and trust in science. Pechar et al. (2018) note that “distrust of 
science on particular issues may stem from an aversion to the source or the policy implications of 
that science” (p. 293). This study supports these previous findings and further highlights the 
limitations of political ideology as a lone driver of scientific skepticism in the context of GM.  
In our study, general confidence in scientists and medical researchers did not have a 
significant effect on support for scientific influence on CC or GM policy, respectively. In line 
with previous findings by Marques et al. (2014), we posit that the broad nature of the confidence 
question, which did not directly relate to scientists involved in the evaluation of scientific 
evidence of climate change or medical researchers involved in the evaluation of the safety of GM 
food, contributed to this finding. Consistent with previous studies (Hart & Nisbet 2012), 
demographic items (gender, age, race, income) did not have a significant effect on support for 
scientific influence on policy. 
A strength of the present study is that it relied on a nationally representative, nonstudent 
group of adult participants. However, the relevance of these results to current political debate is 
limited by the use of an older dataset. We acknowledge that the political landscape has changed 
substantially since this data was collected. To address this limitation, the authors are analyzing 
similar variables using data collected in 2016.  
This is a single study exploring the relationship between source credibility and scientific 
skepticism. This study focused on CC and GM skepticism and public support for scientific 
influence on policies in these domains. Future research could explore additional scientific areas 
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and outcome variables associated with public attitudes toward scientific policy. Furthermore, this 
study did not explore the relationship between motivated reasoning and source credibility, which 
might influence public responses to persuasive messaging, regardless of the characteristics of the 
source (Mutz, 2008). Previous work has found evidence of a relationship between political 
ideology and beliefs about human-induced global warming and overall support for government 
action on climate mitigation (Hamilton, 2015; Hart & Nisbet 2012; Kahan, et al. 2010). Our 
primary focus for this study was to explore the relationship between source credibility and 
scientific skepticism, but future research could explore how responses to climate change 
messages vary when presented by sources with differing levels of credibility and how perceived 
credibility is affected not only by partisan cues but cultural identity, values, and other 
interpretive schemata.  
The source credibility measures used in the present study were single measures. Future 
research should explore whether this is the best measure or if alternative multi-item measures are 
more appropriate and more reliable. Following Pechar et al. (2018), there may be other latent 
factors, such as attitudes toward government and corporations, that mediate perceptions of trust 
in GM and CC science.  
The results reported here have important implications in the public debate over scientific 
credibility, legitimacy, and the role of scientists in the policy-making process. While our first 
model suggested a significant relationship between political ideology and CC skepticism on 
public support for scientific influence on policy, the significant effect of political ideology 
disappeared once the source credibility items were added to the model. This adds to mounting 
evidence suggesting that skepticism about certain scientific issues may emerge in response to 
concerns about source credibility and be related to attitudes about the science-policy interface 
(Nisbet et al., 2015; Pechar et al., 2018). 
  
CONCLUSION   
 
Climate change (CC) and genetically modified foods (GM) are complicated phenomena 
happening at the nexus of science and society (Dunlap & Brulle, 2015; Clancy, 2016; Weber, 
2010). Both also exist within complicated communicative contexts, with various stakeholders 
making multiple and sometimes conflicting claims about the nature and consequences of CC and 
GM (Clancy, 2016; Dunlap & Jacques, 2013; McCright & Dunlap, 2000; Roe & Tiesl, 2007). 
Interpretative schemata, such as pre-existing attitudes and identity, influence audiences’ 
judgements of information sources, including scientists and technical experts (Kahan, et al., 
2010; Passini, 2010; Pechar et al., 2018; Rutjens et al., 2018). Differences in the role of ideology 
on public skepticism about CC and GM warrant further investigation, particularly with more 
recent data that reflect increasing political polarization and greater control over exposure to 
scientific information and sources. 
It is important for science and environmental communication research to continue to 
explore the dynamics at work when judgements about sources’ credibility vary depending on the 
nature of the science in question. Following Horton et al. (2016), we encourage further 
development of a “situationally nuanced understanding of credibility” and the particular 
dimensions that “are most important in each [communication] situation” (p. 31). We also suggest 
further exploration of the specific antecedents that undergird audiences’ resistance to scientific 
evidence.  
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When tested as a multi-item construct, as we did here, source credibility emerges as a 
potential shortcut associated with public evaluation of science and attitudes toward scientific 
influence on policy. Indeed, expertise, trustworthiness, and goodwill all contributed to 
perceptions of CC and GM. Yet research on source credibility largely examines a single 
dimension, primarily perceived trustworthiness and expertise (Frewer, et al., 2003; Engdahl & 
Lidskog, 2014; McCroskey & Teven, 1999; Renn & Levine, 1989). This preliminary study 
supports our ongoing research investigating the potential relationships between these 
antecedents, political ideology, and perceptions of impact versus production science in CC and 
GM. We entreat science and environmental communication researchers to continue exploring the 
multidimensionality of source credibility and its implications for public understanding of science 
and environmental policy. 
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Appendix   A  
 
GSS Survey Questions and Coding   
Variables Survey Items Response Coding 
Global 
warming (GW) 
impact 
skepticism 
 
Scientists predict that global warming may soon have big 
effects on the polar regions. I will describe some of these 
possible effects and, for each one, please say whether it 
would bother you a great deal, some, a little, or not at all if it 
actually happened. 
 
Arctic seals may be threatened.  
The northern ice cap may completely melt. 
By 2020, polar bears may become extinct.  
Sea level may rise by more than 20 feet, flooding coastal 
areas.  
Inuit and other native peoples may no longer be able to 
follow their traditional way of life. 
“a great deal” = 1 
“some” = 2 
“a little” = 3  
“not at all” = 4 
 
GW consensus 
skepticism 
To what extent do environmental scientists agree among 
themselves about the existence and causes of global 
warming? 
 
“near complete 
agreement” = 1 to 
“no agreement at all” 
=5 
 
Support for 
scientific 
influence on 
GW policy 
How much influence should environmental scientists have 
in deciding what to do about global warming? 
 
“a great deal of 
influence” = 1 to 
“none at all” = 4 
Concern about 
genetically 
modified (gm) 
foods  
Which statement best describes your own view about eating 
foods that have been 
genetically modified? 
 
“I don’t care whether 
or not the food I eat 
has 
been genetically 
modified” or “I am 
willing to eat 
genetically modified 
foods, but would 
prefer unmodified 
foods if they are 
available”= 0 
 “I will not eat food 
that I know has been 
genetically 
modified” = 1 
 
Consensus 
skepticism 
about gm foods 
How well medical researchers agree on the risks and 
benefits of genetically modified foods? 
 
“very well” = 1 to  
“not at all” = 5 
Support for 
medical 
researchers 
influence on 
gm policy 
How much influence should medical researchers have in 
deciding whether to restrict the sale of genetically modified 
foods? 
 
“a great deal of 
influence” = 1 to  
“none at all” = 4 
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Appendix B 
 
Group Differences in Perceptions of Scientific Credibility  
 Mean   
Credibility – Environmental Scientists  Liberal Moderate Conservative F p 
To what extent would environmental 
scientists making policy recommendations 
about global warming support what is best 
for the country as a whole or what serves 
their own narrow interests?* 
1.82a 1.96b 2.42c 19.28 <0.001 
How well do environmental scientists 
understand the causes of global warming? 
1.86a 1.84b 2.36c 19.46 <0.001 
To what extent do environmental scientists 
agree among themselves about the 
existence and causes of global warming? 
2.53a 2.60a 2.74a 2.57 0.077 
Credibility – Medical Researchers      
When making policy recommendations 
about genetically modified foods, to what 
extent do you think the following groups 
would support what is best for the country 
as a whole or what serves their own narrow 
interests? 
2.00a 2.37b 2.20ab 6.12 .002 
How well do medical researchers 
understand the risks posed by genetically 
modified foods? 
2.07a 2.25a 2.19a 1.67 .189 
To what extend do all medical researchers 
agree on the risks and benefits of 
genetically modified foods? 
2.82a 2.95a 2.91a 1.15 .318 
* The letters a, b, c are used to differentiate significant mean differences between groups, at the 95% confidence level, as 
identified by Tukey’s HSD tests. Means showing the 
same superscript letter are not statistically different. 
** Values represent group means on a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., 1=“near complete agreement,” 5=“no agreement at all”) 
 
  
